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Abstract:  We study the management of a natural resource that supports ecosystems 
as well as human needs.  The reduction in the resource base poses a threat of 
occurrence of catastrophic ecological events, such as the sudden collapse of the 
natural habitat, that lead to severe loss of biodiversity.  The event occurrence 
conditions involve uncertainty of various types, and the distinction among these types 
affects the optimal exploitation policies.  When uncertainty is due to our ignorance of 
some aspects of the underlying ecology, the isolated equilibrium states characterizing 
optimal exploitation for many renewable resource problems become equilibrium 
intervals, giving rise to hysteresis phenomena.  Events triggered by genuinely 
stochastic environmental conditions maintain the structure of isolated equilibria, but 
the presence of event uncertainty shifts these equilibrium states relative to their 
position under certainty. 
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1.  Introduction 
We study the management of a natural resource that serves a dual purpose: first, 
it supplies inputs for human production activities and is therefore being exploited for 
beneficial use, however defined; second, it supports the existence of other species.  
Large-scale exploitation competes with the needs of the wildlife populations and, 
unless controlled, can severely degrade the ecological conditions and lead to species 
extinction and biodiversity loss.  Examples for such conflicts abound, including:  
(i) water diversions for irrigation, industrial or domestic use reduce in-stream flows 
that support the existence of various fish populations; (ii) reclamation of swamps and 
wetlands that serve as habitat for local plant, bird and animal populations and as a 
"rest area" for migrating birds; (iii) deforestation reduces the living territory of a large 
number of species; and (iv) airborne industrial pollution falls as acid rain on lakes and 
rivers and interferes with systems of freshwater ecology.  In these examples the 
affected species may not contribute directly to human well being but their diminution 
or extinction entails a loss due to use and nonuse values as well as the loss of option 
for future benefits such as the development of new medicines (about half of medicine 
prescriptions originate from organisms found in the wild [Littell 1992, Bird 1991]).   
The global deforestation example illuminates the issue under consideration.  
Until recently, a rainforest area about the size of England was cleared each year 
(Hartwick, 1992), leading to the extinction of numerous species (Colinvaux 1989).  
The biodiversity loss process often takes the form of a sudden collapse of the 
ecosystem, inflicting a heavy damage and affecting the nature of future exploitation 
regimes.  This is so because ecosystems are inherently complex and their highly 
nonlinear dynamics give rise to instabilities and sensitivity to threshold levels of 
essential supplies.  Moreover, ecosystems are often vulnerable to environmental   3
events, such as forest fires, disease outbreaks, or invading populations, which are 
genuinely stochastic in nature.  We refer to the occurrence of a sudden system 
collapse as an ecological event.   
When the biodiversity loss process is gradual and can be monitored and 
controlled by adjusting exploitation rates, and/or when it involves a discrete 
ecological event whose occurrence conditions are a-priori known, it is relatively 
simple to avoid the damage by ensuring that the event will never occur.  Often, 
however, the conditions that trigger ecological events involve uncertainty and the 
corresponding management problems should be modeled as such.  The present study 
characterizes optimal resource exploitation policies under risk of occurrence of 
various types of events.   
Impacts of event uncertainty on resource exploitation policies have been 
studied in a variety of situations, including pollution-induced events (Cropper, 1976, 
Clarke and Reed, 1994, Tsur and Zemel, 1996, 1998b, Aronsson et al., 1998), forest 
fires (Reed, 1984, Yin and Newman, 1996), species extinction (Reed, 1989, Tsur and 
Zemel, 1994), seawater intrusion into coastal aquifers (Tsur and Zemel, 1995), and 
political crises (Long, 1975, Tsur and Zemel, 1998a).  Occurrence risk typically leads 
to prudence and conservation, but in some cases has the opposite effect, encouraging 
aggressive extraction policies in order to derive maximal benefit prior to occurrence 
(Clarke and Reed, 1994).   
Tsur and Zemel (1998b, 2004) trace these apparently conflicting results to 
different assumptions concerning the event occurrence conditions and the ensuing 
damage they inflict.  An important distinction relates to the type of uncertainty.  An 
event is called endogenous if its occurrence is determined solely by the resource 
exploitation policy, although the exact threshold level at which the event is triggered   4
is not a-priori known.  This type of uncertainty is due to our partial ignorance of the 
occurrence conditions and allows to avoid the occurrence risk altogether by keeping 
the resource stock at or above its current state.  Exogenous events, on the other hand, 
are triggered under environmental circumstances that are genuinely stochastic and 
cannot be fully controlled by the resource managers.  With this type of events, no 
exploitation policy is completely safe although the managers can affect the occurrence 
hazard by adjusting the stock of the essential resource. 
We show that the endogenous-exogenous distinction bears important 
implications for optimal exploitation policies and alters properties that are considered 
standard.  For example, the optimal stock processes of renewable resources typically 
approach isolated equilibrium (steady) states.  This feature, it turns out, no longer 
holds under endogenous event uncertainty: the equilibrium point expands into an 
equilibrium interval whose size depends on the expected loss, and the eventual steady 
state is determined by the initial stock.  Endogenous events, thus, can be the source of 
hysteresis phenomena.  In contrast, exogenous events maintain the structure of 
isolated equilibria and the effect of event uncertainty is manifest via the shift it 
induces on these equilibrium states. 
2.  Certain Events 
  We consider the management of some environmental resource that is essential 
to the survival of an ecosystem (or of a key species thereof) and at the same time 
provides an important production factor for anthropogenic activity.  The stock S of the 
resource can denote the area of uncultivated land of potential agricultural use, the 
water level at some lake or stream or the level of cleanliness (measured e.g. by the ph 
level of a water resource affected by acid rain or by industrial effluents).  Without 
human interference, the stock dynamics is determined by the natural regeneration rate   5
G(S) (corresponding to the recharge of the water resource or to the decay rate of the 
pollution stock).  The functional form of G depends on the particular resource under 
consideration, but we assume the existence of some upper bound S for the stock, 
corresponding to the lake's holding capacity or to the natural cleanliness level, so that 
0 ) ( = S G  and  0 ) ( ≤ ′ S G .  With xt representing the rate of resource use (extraction), 
the resource stock evolves with time according to   
t t t t x S G S dt dS − = ≡ ) ( / & .  (2.1)
Extraction activities can have several consequences.  First, they give rise to a 
benefit flow (from the use of land and water or from the economic activities that 
produce the pollutants) at the rate Y(x), where Y is increasing and strictly concave with 
Y(0) = 0.  Second, they bear the cost C(S)x of extracting at the rate x while the stock 
level is S, where the unit cost C(S) is nonincreasing and convex.  In addition, reducing 
the stock level entails damage to the ecosystem that depends on the same resource for 
its livelihood.  The latter damage flows at the rate D(S), where the decreasing damage 
function D is normalized at  0 ) ( = S D .  The instantaneous net benefit is then given by 
Y(x) − C(S)x − D(S).  Finally, reducing the stock below some (possibly a-priori 
unknown) threshold level can trigger the sudden collapse of the ecosystem, inflicting 
a heavy penalty in terms of biodiversity loss and affecting the nature of future 
exploitation regime.  We begin by considering the reference problem of optimal 
extraction when the conditions under which such catastrophic events occur are 
known, and proceed to study the effects of uncertainty under various scenarios 
regarding their occurrence conditions. 
Suppose that driving the stock to some critical level Sc triggers the occurrence 
of some catastrophic event, e.g., a major loss of biodiversity due to habitat destruction   6
which entails a penalty ψ > 0 and prohibits any further decrease of the resource stock.  
The corresponding post-event value is φ(Sc) = W(Sc) − ψ, where  
W(S) = [Y(G(S)) − C(S)G(S) − D(S)]/r   (2.2)
is the steady state value derived from keeping the extraction rate at the natural 
regeneration rate R(S) and r is the rate of discount.  The post-event value φ, thus, 
accounts both for the fact that the stock cannot be further decreased (to avoid further 
damage) and for the catastrophic loss.  Let T denote the event occurrence time (T = ∞ 
if the stock never shrinks to trigger the event at Sc).   
The management problem when the critical stock is known with certainty is 
specified as   
) ( )] ( ) ( ) ( [ ) (
0 } , { 0 T
rT T rt
t t t t x T
c S e dt e S D x S C x Y Max S V
t φ
− − + − − = ∫   (2.3)
subject to (2.1), xt ≥ 0; St ≥ 0; ST = Sc and S0 > Sc given.  Optimal processes associated 
with the certainty problem (2.3) are indicated with a c superscript.  The event 
occurrence is evidently undesirable, since just above Sc it is preferable to extract at the 
regeneration rate and enjoy the benefit flow rW(Sc) associated with it rather than 
trigger the event and bear the penalty ψ.  Thus, the event should be avoided,   
for all t and T = ∞.  It follows that the certainty problem can be formulated as  
c
c
t S S >
∫
∞ − − − =
0 } { 0 )] ( ) ( ) ( [ ) ( dt e x D x S C x Y Max S V
rt
t t t t x
c
t   (2.4)
subject to (2.1), xt ≥ 0; St > Sc and S0 given.  Thus, the effect of the certain event enters 
only via the lower bound on the stock level.  This simple problem is akin to standard 
resource management problems and can be treated by a variety of optimization 
methods (see, e.g., Tsur and Graham-Tomasi, 1991; Tsur and Zemel, 1994, 1995, 
2004).  Here, we briefly review the main properties of the optimal plan.     7
We note first that because problem (2.4) is autonomous (time enters explicitly 
only through the discount factor) the optimal stock process   evolves monotonically 
in time.  The property is based on the observation that if the process reaches the same 
state at two different times, then the planner faces the same optimization problem at 
both times.  This rules out the possibility of a local maximum for the process, because 
the conflicting decisions to increase the stock (before the maximum) and decrease it 
(after the maximum) are taken at the same stock levels.  Similar considerations 




t S ] ,S Sc [  it must approach a steady 
state in this interval.  Using the variational method of Tsur and Zemel (2001), possible 
steady states are located by means of a simple function L(S) of the state variable, 
denoted the evolution function, which measures the deviation of the objective of  (2.4) 
from W(S) due to small variations from the steady state policy x = G(S) (see below).  
In particular, an internal state S ∈ (Sc,S ) can qualify as an optimal steady state only if 
it is a root of L, i.e. L(S) = 0, while the corners Sc or S  can be optimal steady states 
only if L(Sc) ≤ 0 or  , 0 ) ( ≥ S L  respectively.  
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When  ) ( ) 0 ( S C < ′ Y , exploitation is never profitable.  In this case  0 ) ( > S L  and the 
unexploited stock eventually settles at the capacity level S .  The condition for the 
corner solution L(Sc) < 0 is obtained from (2.5) in a similar manner.  Suppose that 
L(S) has a unique root   in [S
c S ˆ
c,S ] (multiple roots are discussed in Tsur and Zemel 
2001).  In this case,   is the unique steady state to which the optimal stock process 
 converges monotonically from any initial state.  
c S ˆ
c
t S  8
The vanishing of the evolution function at an internal steady state represents the 
tradeoffs associated with resource exploitation.  If a steady state is optimal, then 
moving to a steady state nearby must inflict a loss.  Consider a variation on the steady 
state policy x =   in which exploitation is increased during a short 
(infinitesimal) time period dt by a small (infinitesimal) rate dx above   and 
retains the regeneration rate thereafter.  This policy yields the additional benefit 
, but decreases the stock by dS = −dxdt, which, in turn, 
increases the damage by  , the unit extraction cost by C  and the 
extraction cost by G .  The present value of this permanent flow of 
added costs is given by [  (The effective 
discount rate equals the market rate r minus the marginal regeneration rate G′ because 
reducing the stock by a marginal unit and depositing the proceeds at the bank the 
resource owner gains the market interest rate r plus the additional regeneration rate 
−G′, see Pindyck 1984).  At the root of L, these marginal benefit and cost just balance, 
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While the discussion above implies that the stock process must approach  , the 
time to enter the steady state remains a free choice variable.  Using the conditions for 
an optimal entry time, one finds that the optimal extraction rate   smoothly 
approaches the steady state regeneration rate G and the approach of   towards 
the steady state   is asymptotic, i.e., the optimal stock process will not reach the 
steady state at a finite time.  These properties, as well as the procedure to obtain the 








c S ˆ  9
  The results obtained for an internal steady state do not depend on the critical 
state, nor on the penalty inflicted by the event, because the latter enters the certainty 
problem only via the constraint St > Sc  which is not binding when the root of L lies 
above the critical state.  However, with   the function L(S) is negative in the 
feasible interval 
c
c S S ˆ >
] ,S Sc [ , hence no internal steady state can be optimal.  The only 
remaining possibility is the critical level Sc, because the negative value of L(Sc) does 
not exclude this corner state.  The optimal stock process  , then, converges 
monotonically and asymptotically to a steady state at S
c
t S
c.  By keeping the process 
above the path it would follow if the state constraint St > Sc could be ignored, the 
threat of occurrence imposes prudence and a lower rate of extraction. 
  In this formulation the event is never triggered and the exact value of the 
penalty is irrelevant (so long as it is positive).  This result is due to the requirement 
that the post-event stock is not allowed to decrease below the critical level.  Indeed, 
this requirement can be relaxed whenever the penalty is sufficiently large to deter the 
managers from triggering the event in any case.  The lack of sensitivity of the optimal 
policy to the details of the catastrophic event is evidently due to the ability to avoid 
the event occurrence altogether.  This may not be feasible (or optimal) when the 
critical stock level is not a-priory known.  The optimal policy may, in this case, lead 
to unintentional occurrence, whose exact consequences must be accounted for in 
advance.  We turn, in the following section, to analyze the effect of uncertain 
catastrophic events on resource management policies. 
3.  Uncertain Events 
Often the conditions that lead to the event occurrence are imperfectly known 
and may be subject to environmental uncertainty outside the planner's control.  In 
some cases the critical level is a priori unknown, to be revealed only by the event   10
occurrence.  Alternatively, the event may be triggered at any time by external effects 
(such as unfavorable weather conditions or the outburst of a disease).  Since the 
resilience of the ecosystem depends on the current resource stock, the occurrence 
probability also depends on this state.  We refer to the former type of uncertainty—
that due to the planner's ignorance regarding the conditions that trigger the event—as 
endogenous uncertainty (signifying that the event occurrence is solely due to the 
exploitation decisions) and to the latter as exogenous uncertainty.  It turns out that the 
optimal policies under the two types of uncertainty are quite different.  These policies 
are characterized below. 
3.1. Endogenous events:  Such events occur as soon as the resource stock 
reaches some critical level Sc, which is imperfectly known.  The uncertainty regarding 
the occurrence conditions, thus, is entirely due to our ignorance concerning the critical 
level rather than to the influence of exogenous environmental effects.  Let 
F(S) = Pr{Sc ≤ S} and f(S) = dF/dS be the probability distribution and the probability 
density associated with the critical level Sc.  The hazard function, measuring the 
conditional density of occurrence due to a small stock decrease given that the event 
has not occurred by the time the state S was reached, is defined by  
h(S) = f(S)/F(S).   (3.1)
We assume that h(S) does not vanish in the relevant range, hence no state below the 
initial stock can be considered a-priori safe.   
  The distribution of Sc induces a distribution on the event occurrence time T, as 
derived below.  Upon occurrence, the penalty ψ is inflicted and a further decrease in 
stock is forbidden, leaving the post-event value φ(S) = W(S)−ψ.  Given that the event 
has not occurred by the initial time, i.e., that T > 0, we seek the extraction plan that 
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rT T rt
t t t t T x
en
t φ   (3.2)
subject to (2.1), xt ≥ 0; St ≥ 0 and S0 given, where ET represents expectation with 
respect to the distribution of T.  Optimal processes corresponding to the endogenous 
uncertainty problem (3.2) are denoted by the superscript en.  
  As the stock process evolves in time, the managers' assessment of the 
distributions of Sc and T can be modified since at time t they know that Sc must lie 
below  } {
~
0 τ τ S Min S t t ≤ ≤ =  (otherwise the event would have occurred at some time prior 
to t).  Thus, the expected benefit in the objective of (3.2) involves  t S
~
, i.e., the entire 
history up to time t, complicating the optimization task.  The evaluation of the 
expectation in (3.2) is simplified when the stock process evolves monotonically in 
time, in which case  0
~
S St =  if the process is nondecreasing (and no information 
relevant to the distribution of Sc is revealed), or  t t S S =
~
 if the process is nonincreasing 
(and all the relevant information is given by the current stock St).  It turns out that the 
optimal stock process   evolves monotonically in time (Tsur and Zemel, 1994).  
This property extends the reasoning of the certainty case above:  If the process 
reaches the same state at two different times, and no new information on the critical 
level has been revealed during that period, then the planner faces the same 
optimization problem at both times.  This rules out the possibility of a local maximum 





 remains constant around the maximum, yet the conflicting 
decisions to increase the stock (before the maximum) and decrease it (after the 
maximum) are taken at the same stock levels.  A local minimum can also be ruled out 
even though the decreasing process modifies  t S
~
 and adds information on Sc.  
However, it cannot be optimal to decrease the stock under occurrence risk (prior to   12
reaching the minimum) and then increase it with no occurrence risk (after the 
minimum), from the same state.    
For nondecreasing stock processes it is known in advance that the event will 
never occur and the uncertainty problem (3.2) reduces to the certainty problem (2.4).  
When the stock process decreases, the distribution of T is obtained from the 
distribution of Sc as follows:  
1 − FT(t) ≡ Pr{T > t|T > 0} = Pr{Sc < St|Sc < S0} = F(St)/F(S0).  (3.3)
The corresponding density and hazard-rate functions are also expressed in terms of 
the distribution of the critical stock: 
(a)    ) ( / )] ( )[ ( / ) ( ) ( 0 S F S G x S f dt t dF t f t t t T T − = = ,  
(b)    )] ( )[ (
) ( 1
) (
) ( t t t
T
T
T S G x S h
t F
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Let I(⋅) denote the indicator function that obtains the value one when its 
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t t t t T φ , we evaluate the 
expectation of the first term observing that ET{I(T > t)|T > 0} = 1 − FT(t) = F(St)/F(S0).  
The expectation of the second term is obtained, using (3.4), as 
∫ ∫
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φ .  Collecting the terms and 
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aux
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  (3.5)  13
subject to (2.1), xt ≥ 0;   and S
ne
t S S ˆ ≥ 0 given.  The allocation problem for which (3.5) 
is the objective is referred to as the auxiliary problem, and optimal processes 
corresponding to this problem are denoted by the superscript aux.   
The auxiliary problem could be defined for all stock levels in  ]. , 0 S [   
However, we show below that this problem is relevant for the formulation of the 
uncertainty problem (3.2) only for stock levels above the root   of L(S), hence 
replaces the depletion level (S=0) as the lowest feasible stock for (3.5).  
Formulated as an autonomous problem, the auxiliary problem also obtains an optimal 
stock process that evolves monotonically with time.  Notice that at this stage it is not 
clear whether the uncertainty problem (3.2) reduces to the certainty problem or to the 
auxiliary problem, since it is not a priori known whether   decreases with time.  






  The evolution function corresponding to the auxiliary problem (3.5) is given 
by (Tsur and Zemel, 2004) 
L
aux(S) = [L(S) + h(S)rψ]F(S)/F(S0).  (3.6)
In (3.6), L(S) is the evolution function for the certainty problem, defined in (2.3), and 
h(S) is the hazard function defined in (3.1).  Occurrence of the event inflicts an 
instantaneous penalty ψ (or equivalently, a permanent loss flow at the rate rψ) that 
could have been avoided by keeping the stock at the level S.  The second term in the 
square brackets of (3.6) gives the expected loss due to an infinitesimal decrease in 
stock.  Moreover, this term is positive at the lower bound  , whereas  , 
hence  , implying that   cannot be an optimal equilibrium for the 
auxiliary problem.   
c S ˆ 0 ) ˆ ( =
c S L
0 ) ˆ ( >
c aux S L
c S ˆ  14
The eventual steady state depends on the magnitude of the expected loss: for 
moderate losses, L
aux vanishes at some stock level   in the interval 
aux S ˆ ) , ˆ S S
c ( .  We 
assume that the root   is unique.  Higher expected losses ensure that L
aux S ˆ aux > 0 
throughout, leaving only the corner state  S S
aux = ˆ  as a potential steady state.  The 




]. , ˆ [ S S
c    
  In order to characterize the optimal extraction plan for the endogenous 
uncertainty problem (3.2), we compare the trajectories of the auxiliary problem with 
those obtained with the certainty problem corresponding to Sc ≤ 0 (the latter can be 
referred to as the 'non-event' problem because the event cannot be triggered; see Tsur 
and Zemel 2004): 
(i)  When   the optimal certainty stock process   increases in time.  
With event risk, it is possible to secure the certainty value by applying the certainty 
policy, since an endogenous event can occur only when the stock decreases.  The 
introduction of occurrence risk cannot increase the value function, hence   must 
increase.  This implies that the uncertainty and certainty processes coincide,   
for all t, and increase monotonically towards the steady state   
, ˆ
0









t S S =
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(ii)  When   both   and   decrease in time.  If   is 
increasing, it must coincide with the certainty process  , contradicting the 
decreasing trend of the latter.  A similar argument rules out a steady state policy.  
Thus,   must decrease, coinciding with the auxiliary process   and converging 
with it to the auxiliary steady state     
, ˆ ˆ
0
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(iii)  When   the certainty stock process   decreases (or 
remains constant if  ) and the auxiliary stock process   increases (or 
remains constant if  ).  If   increases, it must coincide with  , and if it 
decreases it must coincide with  , leading to a contradiction in both cases.  The 
only remaining possibility is to follow the steady state policy   at all t. 
, ˆ ˆ
0
c aux S S S ≥ ≥
c S S ˆ
0 =

















  To sum:   
(a)    increases at stock levels below   
en
t S . ˆc S
(b)    decreases at stock levels above   
en
t S . ˆaux S
(c) All stock levels in [  are equilibrium states of  .  ] ˆ , ˆ aux c S S
en
t S
  The equilibrium interval is unique to optimal stock processes under 
endogenous uncertainty.  Its boundary points attract any process initiated outside the 
interval while processes initiated within it must remain constant.  This feature is 
evidently related to the splitting of the endogenous uncertainty problem into two 
distinct optimization problems depending on the initial trend of the optimal stock 
process.  At   the expected loss due to occurrence is so large that entering the 
interval cannot be optimal even if under certainty extracting above the regeneration 
rate would yield a higher benefit.  Within the equilibrium interval it is possible to 
eliminate the occurrence risk altogether by not reducing the stock below its current 
level.  As we shall see below, this possibility is not available under exogenous 
uncertainty, hence the corresponding management problem does not give rise to 
equilibrium intervals. 
, ˆaux S
  Endogenous uncertainty, then, implies more conservative extraction than the 
certainty policy for any initial stock above    Observe that the steady state   is a  . ˆc S
aux S ˆ  16
planned equilibrium level.  In actual realizations, the process may be interrupted by 
the event at a higher stock level and the actual equilibrium level in such cases will be 
the occurrence state Sc.   
A feature similar to both the certainty and endogenous uncertainty processes is 
the smooth transition to the steady states.  When the initial stock is outside the 
equilibrium interval, the condition for an optimal entry time to the steady state implies 
that extraction converges smoothly to the recharge rate and the planned steady state 
will not be entered at a finite time.  It follows that when the critical level actually lies 
below   uncertainty will never be resolved and the planner will never know that 
the adopted policy of approaching   is indeed safe.  Of course, in the less fortunate 
case in which the critical level lies above the steady state, the event will occur, 
resolving uncertainty at a finite time.  
, ˆaux S
aux S ˆ
3.2  Exogenous events:  Ecological events that are triggered by environmental 
conditions beyond the planers' control are called exogenous.  The current resource 
stock level can affect the hazard of immediate occurrence through its effect on the 
resilience of the ecosystem, but the collapse event is triggered by stochastic changes 
in exogenous conditions.  This type of event uncertainty was introduced by Cropper 
(1976) and analyzed by Clarke and Reed (1994), Tsur and Zemel (1998b, 2004) and 
Aronsson et al. (1998) in the contexts of nuclear waste control, environmental 
pollution and groundwater resource management.  Here we consider the implications 
for biodiversity conservation.  Under exogenous uncertainty, the fact that a certain 
stock level has been reached in the past without triggering the event does not rule out 
occurrence at the same stock level sometime in the future, as the exogenous 
conditions may turn out to be less favorable.  Therefore, the mechanism that gives rise 
to the equilibrium interval under endogenous uncertainty does not work here.   17
  As above, the post-event value is denoted by φ(S).  The expected value from 
an extraction plan that can be interrupted by an event at time T is again given by the 
objective of (3.2), but for exogenous events the probability distribution of T, 
F(t) = Pr{T≤t}, is defined in terms of a stock-dependent hazard rate h(S)  
h(St) = f(t)/[1−F(t)] = −d{log[1−F(t)]}/dt,  (3.7)
as 
] ) ( [ 1 ) (
0 ∫ − − =
t
d S h exp t F τ τ .  (3.8)
  We assume that no stock level is completely safe, hence h(S) does not vanish 
and the integral in (3.8) diverges for any feasible process as t→∞.  We further assume 
that h(S) is decreasing, i.e., increasing the stock improves conditions for the 
ecosystem and reduces the hazard for environmental collapse.    
  Using (3.8) to evaluate the expected value derived from any feasible process 
we obtain the exogenous uncertainty problem:  



















+ − − −
=
∫ ∫∫
  (3.9) 
subject to (2.1), xt ≥ 0; St ≥ 0 and S0 given.  Unlike the auxiliary problem (3.5) used 
above to characterize the optimal policy under endogenous events, (3.9) provides the 
correct formulation for the exogenous uncertainty problem regardless of whether the 
stock process decreases or increases.   
To characterize the steady state, we need to specify the value W
ex(S) associated 
with the steady state policy x
ex = G(S).  Exogenous events may interrupt this policy, 
hence W
ex(S) differs from the value function W(S) of (2.5) obtained from the steady 
state policy under certainty or endogenous uncertainty.  Under the steady state policy,   18
(3.8) reduces to the exponential distribution F(t) = 1 − exp[−h(S)t], yielding the 
expected value  
W
ex(S) = W(S) − [W(S)−φ(S)]h(S)/[r+h(S)].  (3.10)
where the second term represents the expected loss over an infinite time horizon.  The 
explicit time dependence of the distribution F(t) of (3.8) does not allow presenting the 
optimization problem (3.9) in an autonomous form.  Nevertheless, the argument for 
the monotonic behavior of the optimal stock process   holds, and the associated 




ex(S) = L(S) + d{[φ(S)−W(S)]rh(S)/[r+h(S)]}/dS.  (3.11)
  When the event corresponds to species extinction, it can occur only once since 
the loss is irreversible.  If a further reduction in stock is forbidden, the post-event 
value is again specified as φ(S) = W(S) − ψ , and the second term of (3.11) simplifies 
to  −ψ h'(S)r
2/[r+h(S)]
2.  For decreasing hazard functions this term is positive and 
L
ex(S) > L(S).  Since L(S) is positive below  , so must L
c S ˆ ex(S) be, precluding any 
steady state below  .  Thus, the root   of L
c S ˆ ex S ˆ ex(S) must lie above the nonevent 
equilibrium, implying that the extraction policy is more conservative than its nonevent 
counterpart. 
Biodiversity conservation considerations enter via the second term of (3.11) 
which measures the marginal expected loss due to a small decrease in the resource 
stock.  The latter implies a higher occurrence risk, which in turn calls for more 
prudent extraction policy.  Indeed, if the hazard is state-independent, the second term 
of (3.11) vanishes, implying that the evolution functions of the certainty and 
exogenous uncertain event problems are the same and so are their steady states.  In 
this case, extraction activities have no effect on the expected loss hence the tradeoffs 
that determine the optimal equilibrium need not account for the penalty, no matter   19
how large it may be.  For a decreasing hazard, however, the degree of prudence (as 
measured by the difference   between the equilibrium states) increases with 
the penalty ψ . 
c ex S S ˆ ˆ −
The requirement that the stock must not be reduced following occurrence can 
be relaxed.  For this situation, the post-event value changes to φ(S) = V
c(S) − ψ , 
yielding a somewhat more complex expression for the evolution function, but the 
prudence property   remains valid (Tsur and Zemel, 1998b). 
c ex S S ˆ ˆ >
  Another interesting situation involving exogenous events arises when the 
ecological damage can be fixed (at the cost ψ) following occurrence.  For example, 
the extinct population may not be endemic to the inflicted region and can be restored 
by importing individuals from unaffected habitats.  Under this scenario, event 
occurrence inflicts the penalty but does not affect the hazard of future events.  The 
post-event policy, then, is to remain at the steady state and receive the post-event 
value W
ex(S) − ψ.  Using F(t) = 1 − exp[−h(S)t] for recurrent events yields the 
expected steady state value W
ex(S) = W(S) − [W(S)−W
ex(S)+ψ]h(S)/[r+h(S)].  Solving 
for W
ex(S), we find W
ex(S) = W(S) − ψh(S)/r,  reducing (3.11) to  
L
ex(S) = L(S) − d[ψh(S)]/dS.  (3.12)
  When the penalty itself depends on the stock, its policy implications become 
more involved.  Of particular interest is the case of increasing ψ(S) and constant 
hazard, for which (3.12) implies more vigorous extraction.  This situation corresponds 
to the irreversible catastrophic events of Clarke and Reed (1994), which give rise to 
extraction policies that are less prudent than their certainty counterparts. 
  The results presented in this section highlight the sensitivity of the optimal 
uncertainty processes to the details of an interrupting event.  The type of uncertainty 
determines the equilibrium structure: endogenous uncertainty gives rise to equilibrium   20
intervals while exogenous uncertainty implies isolated equilibrium states.  In most 
cases, the expected event loss encourages conservation (more prudent extraction 
policies), but the opposite behavior can also be obtained.  
4.  Concluding comments 
Renewable resources are typically considered in the context of their potential 
contribution to human activities but they also support ecological needs that are often 
overlooked.  This work examines the implications of threats of ecological events for 
the management of renewable resources.  The occurrence of an ecological event 
inflicts a penalty and changes the management regime.  Unlike other sources of 
uncertainty (time-varying costs and demand, stochastic regeneration processes, etc.) 
which allow to update the extraction policy along the process and respond to changing 
conditions, event uncertainty is resolved by occurrence, when policy changes are no 
longer useful.  Thus, the expected loss must be fully accounted for prior to the event 
occurrence, with significant changes to the optimal exploitation rules.  
We distinguish between two types of events that differ in the conditions that 
trigger their occurrence.  An endogenous event occurs when the resource stock 
crosses an uncertain threshold level, while exogenous events are triggered by 
coincidental environmental conditions.  We find that the optimal exploitation policies 
are sensitive to the type of the threatening events.  Under endogenous uncertain 
events, the optimal stock process approaches the nearest edge of an equilibrium 
interval, or remains constant if the initial stock lies inside the equilibrium interval.  
The eventual equilibrium stock depends on the initial conditions.  This phenomenon is 
familiar from the theory of irreversible investments under uncertainty, and is referred 
to as 'hysteresis'.  In contrast, the equilibrium states under exogenous uncertain events 
are singletons that attract the optimal processes from any initial stock.  The shift of   21
these equilibrium states relative to their certainty counterparts is due to the marginal 
expected loss associated with the events and serves as a measure of how much 
prudence it implies.   
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